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Article 1

The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse
Mark Tushnet*
The Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith1 outraged most scholars of the Free Exercise C l a ~ s e I. ~
am among the relatively few who believe that the Court
. ~ reasons are, I
reached the right doctrinal result in S m i t ? ~My
think, even more idiosyncratic than my position. They are
founded on my discomfort with the rhetoric of free exercise
discourse under the pre-Smith regime, in which generous
promises of sensitivity to eccentric religious practices were
routinely betrayed. In this essay, I explore the rhetoric of free
exercise discourse. Part I1 focuses on two aspects of that
rhetoric: the prevalence of strongly phrased "slippery-slope"
arguments against Smith and the revitalization of originalist
arguments in support of pre-Smith law. Part I11 explains why I
believe that the more honest rhetoric of Smith is, ultimately,
more respectful of religious exercise, even of religious exercise
that is suppressed under Smith but that may have been
protected under the pre-Smith regime.

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank participants
in the Symposium, especially Edward Gaffney, Emily Fowler Hartigan, Craig
Mousin, Stephen Pepper, and Ruti Teitel, for their comments on a draft of this
essay.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2.
For citations to the highly critical literature, see James E. Ryan, Smith and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV.
1407, 1409 n.15 (1992).
Some critics of the doctrine the Court amounced in Smith suggest that the
3.
Court reached the correct result in finding it permissible for a state to refuse to
exempt from its drug-abuse laws those who use drugs as part of a religious rite
(or, more narrowly and more controversially, to allow a state to deny
unemployment benefits to those fired from their jobs because of their [permissibly
criminalized] drug use during a religious ceremony).
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11. "THE SKYIS FALLING":
DEALING
WITH Smith

A. Down the Slippery Slope to Religious Persecution
Understandably, advocates generally find "slippery-slope"
arguments effective, particularly when they are addressing
nonspecialists. Therefore, opponents of Smith typically point
out that, under the Court's new doctrine, governments can
"dictate the location of a n altar in a Catholic church" or
"equate[] the rights of churches with the rights of pornographic
movie theaters.'" Even worse, according to one of the rhetorically effective anti-Smith slippery-slope arguments, a minister
who allows minors to participate in communion could be prosecuted under Smith for violating a state's ban on serving alcohol
to minors.
Upon inspection, however, the substantive failings of such
arguments are evident. Indeed, the parade of horribles marshalled by those attacking Smith apparently broke rank even
. ~ that sense, the antiSmith
before the march got ~ n d e r w a y In
rhetoric resembles discourse about tort reform or political correctness. Horror stories are told to demonstrate the existence of
serious problems? yet, although some horror stories are doubtless true, readers are given no basis for determining the real
rate or number of outrages. Accordingly, some skepticism is
natural, and with regard to the claims that Smith threatens
religious liberty in some novel way, such skepticism is more
than justified. In practice, pre-Smith law was not all that protective of religious exercise, and because post-Smith law is
constrained by nonconstitutional factors, the practical reality of
religious protection after Smith is substantially similar to the
practical reality of religious protection before Smith was decided.

4.
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2
(citing Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 663 @.
Minn. 1990)).
5.
Sometimes genuine controversy may exist over whether the horribles that
are paraded are really that horrible. This seems to be particularly true of the
application of antidiscrimination and labor laws to some aspects of church-related
operations. For Laycock's examples, see id. at 43-44. The question may be posed,
"Is there now no constitutional barrier to unionized parochial schools?" Id. at 44.
For me, if the answer is yes, the sky will not have fallen.
For a discussion of the rhetoric of political correctness, see Mark Tushnet,
6.
Political Correctness, the Law, and the Legal Academy, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.127
(1992).
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To illustrate, consider Laycock's suggestion that Smith
allows government to determine where a n altar should be located in a particular church. Laycock utilizes this example on
the first page of his article, significantly titled The Remnants of
Free Exercise.' Laycock indicates that "[sltate and local governments have already relied on Smith for authority to dictate the
location of an altar in a Catholic church."' If a reader is less
than diligent in reviewing Laycock's article and so careless as
to ignore the footnotes, he or she might think that some government had actually succeeded in dictating the altar's location. The appended footnotes, however, deserve some attention.
Laycock supports his assertion by citing a brief filed by the
Boston Landmarks Commission i n the Massachusetts Supreme
.~
pages later, the reader attentive to
Judicial C ~ u r t Fifty-five
footnotes will discover that the Massachusetts court "ignor[ed]
Smith and grant[ed] religious exemptions under [the] state
constit~tion."~~
While advocates writing briefs will "rely on"
whatever they think helpful to their client's position, whether
their arguments accurately reflect the law is quite another
matter. Treating the threat to the altar's location as posing a
real risk of religious persecution is an overstatement.
The altar location case explicitly illustrates one set of constraints on the post-Smith regime. In addition, it implicitly directs attention to the most important feature of the pre-Smith,
regime. The Federal Constitution is not the only limiting force
that keeps governments from engaging in religious persecution.
Consider the example of serving liquor to minors a t communion. Before someone could say that the Supreme Court's decision in Smith contributed to a minister's imprisonment, he or
she would first need to consider the other barriers to the
minister's prosecution that would need to be overcome before
such a prosecution could be successful. First, a local prosecutor
must decide to prosecute the minister. If, as the example is
designed to show, the prospect of such a prosecution is truly
horrible, we might imagine that the prosecutor would think
long and hard about how such a prosecution would affect his or

7. Laycock, supra note 4, at 1.
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. Id. at 2 n.4.
10. Id. at 55 11.218. For a discussion of postSmith cases under state constitutions, see Neil C. McCabe, The State and Federal Religion Clauses: Differences of
Degree and Kind, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV.49, 51-62 (1992).
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her chance for reelection. Next, the courts, including the state's
highest court, must determine that the statute banning the
service of liquor to minors should not be construed to include
a n exemption for religious practices. Additionally, those courts
must reject the argument that the state's constitution adopts a
stricter standard in its free exercise provision than the federal
standard articulated in Smith. All of these possibilities might
occur. Given the political pressures that would generate such a
(hypothesized) prosecution, however, one is entitled to wonder
whether federal courts applying pre-Smith law would have
stood up to such pressures.
Of course, the horror stories may have a fundion apart
from their "predictive" value with regard to Smith's consequences. Using symbols the reader values, they may be designed to mobilize the reader's sympathies by illustrating the
impact Smith had on the Native Americans who were denied
the ability to use peyote in their ceremonies. Readers who, in
their religious exercise, view communion as having a sacred
prominence similar to that of peyote for the Native American
Church are invited to imagine what it would feel like if the
government denied their children the opportunity to participate
in the ceremony.
For some audiences, this rhetorical device may work. Others, however, may deny that the peyote .ceremony is at all similar to communion. They may argue that one is a n animist ritual while the other is participation in the one true church; or,
that one is drug abuse while the other is a religious ceremony.
Thomas Nagel makes the point more generally:
This is really a problem of how to interpret the familiar
role-reversal argument in ethics: "How would you like it if
someone did that to you?" That argument invites the further
question, "How would I like it if someone did what to me?"
Since there is more than one true description of every action,
the selection of the morally operative one is crucial. If someone believes that by restricting freedom of worship he is saving innocent people from the risks of eternal damnation to
which they are exposed by deviation from the true faith, then
under that description he presumably would want others t o
do the same for him, if he were in spiritual danger. But under
the description "restricting freedom of worship," he wouldn't
want others to do i t to him, since in light of the fact that his
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is the true faith, this would be to hinder his path to salvation. l1

Regardless of whether they are used as prediction or rhetorical trope, the horribles paraded by those opposing Smith
implicitly illustrate that pre-Smith law dealing with historic
preservation law and church property was not that protective." For example, Laycock indignantly discusses the Second
Circuit's decision upholding t h e designation of St.
Eartholomew's Church as a historic landmark, which severely
impaired the church's ability to raise money for its religiously
motivated charitable operations. But Laycock fails to point out
that the Second Circuit af%irmed a district court's application of
pre-Smith law.''
Indeed, the point is much more general. As Judge Noonan
and others have shown,14 the actual protection afforded religious exercise by the Supreme Court and federal appellate
courts applying pre-Smith law is not nearly as great a s postSmith rhetoric suggests. One enumeration lists seventeen Supreme Court cases between 1963 and 1990 addressing free
exercise claims, of which only four (twenty-three percent) prevailed.15 Similarly, out of ninety-seven cases in the courts of
appeals during the 1980s, free exercise claims prevailed i n only
twelve (twelve percent)? Another article, compiling almost
11. THOMASNAGEL,EQUALITY
AND PARTIALITY
162 (1991). Nagel's example flips
the Smith problem around, but the analytic point remains the same.
12. See, e.g., Lakewood Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City
of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a municipal zoning ordinance which prohibited the construction of church buildings in virtually all residential districts of the city did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Grosz v. Miami
Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a zoning ordinance prohibiting
church meetings in homes was constitutional).
13. Rector of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914
F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991), discussed in Laycock,
supra note 4, a t 57-58. Laycock treats cases involving "judicial destruction of a minority faithn through the imposition of "multi-million dollar tort judgments" in similar fashion. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAULL. REV. 993, 1014-15 & n.89 (1990) (citing cases imposing liability under preSmith law).
14. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 627-29 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Noonan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989). On the cited pages,
Judge Noonan lists 72 courts of appeals cases raising free exercise claims, of which
seven (nine percent) prevailed.
Ryan, supra note 2, at 1458. Of the four cases, three were unemployment
15.
compensation cases that the Court found indistinguishable from Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), the doctrinal source of preSmith law.
Ryan, supra note 2, a t 1459-62.
16.
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one hundred pre-Smith cases from state supreme courts and
federal courts of appeals for a period ending in 1989, found
that the free exercise claim was sustained in only fourteen of
eighty-five cases (sixteen percent). l7
Candid critics of Smith acknowledge this rather dismal
picture of the regime to which they wish to return.'' Of course
a twenty-five percent chance of winning, under pre-Smith law
i n practice, is better than no chance of winning under Smith.
Still, the change occasioned by Smith is not a change from the
bright daylight of religious freedom to the dark night of religious persecution. If the metaphor is apt, even before Smith it
was deep twilight.
The defense of the pre-Smith regime takes a peculiar turn
when these statistics are raised. Admitting that the chances of
winning litigated cases under pre-Smith law were not really
that favorable, defenders of pre-Smith law suggest that Smith
impaired religious freedom not so much by changing the ultimate outcome in cases that are litigated, but by taking an
argument away from those defending religious liberty. Under
pre-Smith law, opponents of regulation could point out that the
proposals they were fighting had to serve a compelling state
interest. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that courts found
things "compelling" that lay observers might consider rather
unimportant, in the arena of legislation and negotiation the
compelling state interest argument was often effective.
By removing the free exercise issue from the bargaining
table, Smith necessarily eliminates the potential effectiveness
of the free exercise argument and its compelling state interest
standard. Of course, because it frequently failed if a case went
to litigation, the free exercise argument was usually not a powerful bargaining chip to begin with. Smith essentially changes
the probability of the argument's success from low to nothing a t
all. Nevertheless, the defense seems to go, because lawyers
representing religious institutions tend to be better than their
government opponents, the former can flimflam the latter into

17.
Anthony A. Cavallo, The Free Exercise of Religion: Is It Truly Free or
Merely Convenient to the States? (Spring 1990) (unpublished paper, on file with
author). I am grateful to Professor Gerard Bradley for making this paper available
to me.
18.
The only area in which free exercise claims prevailed with some regularity
are prison food and appearance cases. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 1434-37 (noting
that cases were "judged under a less exacting standard than the compelling interest test" and suggesting that outcomes would therefore not be changed by Smith).
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giving up some of their position by presenting them with a n
argument that probably will not succeed. Having to confront
even a low-probability risk of losing, city and state attorneys
will be more accommodating than if they face no risk a t all.
As a hard-line legal realist, I have some sympathy with
this argument, but I doubt that taking pre-Smith doctrine
away from these superior lawyers really makes it that much
harder for them to prevail. Smith does not, after all, guarantee
that government regulators will win; they may lose on various
statutory or state constitutional grounds. I n addition, in light
of its weaknesses, the mere fact that the free exercise argument is a constitutional one should not influence bargaining
positions in any significant way. Perhaps the absence of the
free exercise argument would make a difference if it rested
upon a clear constitutional mandate, and deprived of it, lawyers for religious institutions were relegated to obscure arguments about implied exceptions to otherwise clear statutory
language. But again, pre-Smith law was not clear enough to
provide that kind of clear constitutional argument. Hence, although Smith dictates a marginal shift in the bargaining context, that shift is too small to justify the strong claims found i n
anti-Smith rhetoric as to just how terrible Smith's effects
are.
B. Back to the Founders
Smith appeared just before Michael Mcconnell's major
reexamination of the original understanding of free exercise
was published in the Haruard Law Review?' In a petition for
rehearing, the Smith Court was told that McConnell's article
"demonstrates that the broader reading of the [Free Exercise]
Clause rejected by the Court was contemplated by the Framers
of the First Amendment."21 One commentator says that

19.
One real effect on bargaining should be noted. Before Smith, litigators could
sometimes structure their cases under the Civil Rights Ad. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983
(1988). If they prevailed, even-to some extent-on nonconstitutional grounds (if
those grounds were in some important sense related to the free exercise claim),
they would be entitled to attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. 5 1988 (1988). After Smith, the
chances of recovering attorneys' fees in such a case are much smaller. Smith, that
is, reduced the stakes of losing for government regulators.
20.
Michael W. M c C o ~ e l l ,The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1410 (1990).
21.
Petition for Rehearing at 5, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, reh'g
denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990). The petition refers, without citation a t this point, to
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Mcconnell "conclud[es] that the framers .believed that the [Free
Exercise Clause] requires exemptions from generally applicable
laws that burden religious practice^."^^
McConnell's conclusions were in fact more qualified. He
found that religious exemptions were familiar to the Framers'
generation, and that some evidence indicated that pre-Smith
free exercise doctrine was compatible with the Framers' understanding of free exercise. Many of Mcconnell's readers, on the
other hand, believe his article stands for the stronger proposition that pre-Smith doctrine was "what the Framers intended."
That his readers would reach that conclusion is quite understandable. McConnell's article employs the best sort of 'law
office history," a rhetorical form designed to give historical evidence favorable to an advocate's position the most weight it can
bear, while a t the same time explaining away apparently unfavorable evidence.
Although McConnell's formal conclusions are carefully
he regularly construes ambiguous evidence i n favor of his interpretation, when it could just as easily be construed against it. For example, in examining the history surrounding the drafting of the First Amendment, he treats changes to the Amendment's language that seem to go against mandatory exemptions as "no more than stylistic" changes or "mistranscription[s]." He massages other changes to show that they
are a t least consistent with the view that exemptions are mandator~.~~
Perhaps more dramatically, h e summarizes t h e
postadoption judicial interpretations of the principle of free
exercise in this way:
One lower court in New York squarely adopted the exemptions interpretation, and the supreme courts of Pennsylvania
and South Carolina rejected it. None of these decisions was
"recent research on the history of the Free Exercise Clause." Id. Elsewhere it refers to McCo~ell'sarticle as a "detailed recitation of the origins of the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 11. Professor M c C o ~ e l was
l
one of 55 law professors who were
of counsel on the petition for rehearing.
The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HAFW. L. REV. 129,
22.
209 n.91 (1990).
23.
See, e.g., McCo~ell,supra note 20, at 1420 (stating that "[tlhe historical
record casts doubt on" the current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause) (emphasis added); id. at 1513 (stating that "[tlhe history subsequent to adoption of the
first amendment is inconclusive but tends to point against exemptions," but that
the cases are "weak indicators of the original understanding").
24.
See id. at 1482-83.
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handed down within twenty years of the [First Amendment],
and they are therefore weak indicators of the original understanding. The Pennsylvania holding is entitled to especially
little weight since i t was connected to a rejection of constitutional judicial review in general.25

As stated, this conclusion is accurate, but it overlooks material
that McConnell, an honest scholar, had previously presented.
McConnell's conclusion simply ignores a 1793 Pennsylvania
Supreme Court holding that rejected a religious exemption."
The Pennsylvania court reached its holding within two years of
the First Amendment's adoption, and as far as we can tell, the
court's holding was not connected to some principled opposition
to judicial review. Of course, McConnell might respond, as
lawyers drafting briefs typically do, that the 1793 holding is
"cryptic" and ~ n e l a b o r a t e d .Still,
~ ~ one inclined to a different
interpretation might evaluate the evidence differently.
The evidence is compatible with this alternative interpretation: Every appellate court that considered the question in the
decades after the adoption of the First Amendment rejected the
argument that the principle of free exercise required that religious believers be exempted fkom compliance with generally
applicable statutes. One unreported decision of a New York
trial court supports exemptions, but that decision survives only
because one of the lawyers in the case distributed the decision
in pamphlet form; there is no reason to believe that the opinion
or pamphlet reflected anything more than one judge's views.
Perhaps the understanding of the free exercise principle
changed in the decades after 1791, but the religious history of
this country does not suggest that such a dramatic transformation occurred. Thus, taken as a whole, the evidence of
postadoption interpretation strongly suggests that the free
exercise principle does not require the government to exempt
religious believers from generally applicable laws.
Mcconnell's article also obscures another difficulty. He
ends his discussion of early judicial interpretations by saying
that "the actual practice favored exemptions, even though the
appellate decisions went the other way."" To the modern ear,
this immediately triggers the thought that the Constitution did
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1513.
Id. at 1504 (citing Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793)).
See id.
Id. at 1511.
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not require religious exemptions precisely because practice
favored them. In modern terms, practice involves decisions to
extend exemptions as a matter of public policy-decisions made
by the executive and legislative branches of government, not
the courts. Such permissible accommodations of religion raise
no free exercise questions at all, but only questions about
whether they violate the antiestablishment principle. In contrast, pre-Smith doctrine dealt with mandatory accommodations of religion-those accommodations as to which legislatures are deprived of choice by the free exercise principle. Accordingly, some 200 years of legislative practice may indicate
that exemptions are not required by the free exercise princip l e a conclusion that is at least marginally strengthened by
McConnel17sdevotion of several pages in his article to an examination of such permissive legislative accommodations.29
Of course, one can construct an argument connecting the
legislative practice of extending religious exemptions to a doctrine of mandatory accommodation. According to that argument, prior to the First Amendment's adoption, legislatures
were the only government institutions available to enforce a
generally agreed-upon principle that religious beliefs must be
accommodated by government. When they enacted accommodations of religion, legislators were not-in their own e y e s d o i n g
something they were merely permitted to do; rather, they were
doing what they believed the fundamental principle of free
exercise required them to do. That is, pre-1791 practice reflects
a principle that was ultimately articulated in the First Amendment.
Following the Amendment's adoption, the judiciary was
available to enforce the principle of mandatory accommodation
when legislatures failed to accommodate religious exercise
voluntarily. And, McConnell argues, the best interpretation of
the standard used in legislative practices-language akin to
"destructive of peace and good order7'-is the equivalent of preSmith doctrine. As McConnell puts it:
If, . . . as seems to be the case, the exemptions were granted
because legislatures believed the free exercise principle required them, it is reasonable to suppose that framers of constitutional free exercise provisions understood that similar
applications of the principle would be made by the courts,

29.

Id. at 1466-73.
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once courts were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing
the mandates of free e~ercise.~'

Admittedly, this is a n ingenious argument, but it is a n argument not strongly supported by history because only one court
seems to have accepted a principle of mandatory accommodation following the First Amendment's adoption in 1791.
As a historian, McConnell is a fine lawyer. Like nearly all
efforts to invoke original understanding to support contemporary positions in constitutional law, his analysis resolves evidentiary ambiguities with more precision than the evidence
justifies and, more important, imposes a modern frame of
thinking on old material with which it does not comfortably fit.
Like the "slippery-slope" rhetoric's exaggeration of the difference between the protections afforded religious liberty before
and after Smith, Mcconnell's analysis of the Framers' original
understanding exaggerates the similarities between the
Framers' understanding and the doctrine the Supreme Court
adhered to before Smith.

C. A Modern Paradigm
A case involving Georgetown University provides a final
example of the rhetoric of free exercise scholarship and serves
as a useful transition to Part I11 of this essay. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University3' is regularly offered as an
example of how government can impose severe regulatory constraints on the religiously dictated aspects of a religious
organization's operations when it is pursuing interest-group influenced legislative agendas-agendas that are well-intentioned
and arguably desirable when applied to nonreligious institutions. As Laycock puts it, the case illustrates the kind of clash
between religion and government in which "churches . . . find
that they simply cannot practice important parts of their faith,
even within the enclave of the religious c o m m ~ n i t y . " ~ ~
The case involved the application of the District of Colum-

Id. at 1473. To the extent that M c C o ~ e l lpresents evidence of the reasons
30.
for enacting accommodations, it seems to me to point against principle and in
favor of policy, as in his quotation from the resolution of the Continental Congress.
Id. at 1469 (certain exemptions made grudgingly in recognition of "alleged scruple
of conscience"); id. at 1470 (diEculty in enforcing assessments for support of religious establishments).
31.
536 A.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
32.
Laycock, supra note 4, at 56.
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bia human rights ordinance to the student activities programs
of Georgetown University, a n institution aniliated with the
Society of Jesus. The human rights ordinance bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and the gay-rights
plaintiffs contended that, because the University "recognized"
other student groups, it had to "recognize" the gay-rights group
on equal terms. The University was willing to provide facilities
to the group on a n equal basis-allowing it to reserve rooms,
use bulletin boards, and the like-but contended that any further "recognition" of the group would constitute a form of endorsement inconsistent with the University's religious commitments. In interpreting the ordinance, the court of appeals held
that the city required the University to provide services and
facilities to gay-rights groups on the same terms it provided
them to other student organizations, but it did not find that the
ordinance required the University to formally "recognize" the
group*
Two aspects of the Georgetown gay-rights case deserve
note. First, it shows that a case often presented as an example
of how religious institutions can be persecuted is not at all a
good example of persecution. From the University's point of
view, the government was not attempting to persecute it or
otherwise violate its religious commitments by applying the
human rights ordinance to the University's student activities
program. I n fact, the University did not find that the ordinance, as interpreted by the court of appeals, intruded on any
of its religious commitments. Moreover, although Congress has
enacted a statute barring the District of Columbia from enforcing its human rights ordinance against religious institutions,
Georgetown has not relied on that statute or changed the way
it treats the gay-rights group. Thus, Smith is completely irrelevant to the Georgetown story; the government asked nothing of
the University that conflicted with its religious commitments.
Second, I do not mean to suggest that reaching the ultimate outcome in the gay-rights case was painless to the University. The positions the University took in litigation sometimes caused unnecessary difficulty within the institution itself,
particularly because the distinction between "recognition" and
equal treatment with respect to facilities was both ill-defined
and difficult to explain to the numerous University constituencies. In the end, however, the difficulties associated with the
litigation were productive. For over a decade, the University's
constituencies received a n education in the University's reli-

-
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gious commitments: they were forced to confront the implications and commitments entailed in Georgetown's affiliation
with the Society of Jesus. Such confrontation suggests a different perspective on law-religion relations after Smith.
111. LIVINGWITH Smith:THE RELIGION-STATE
INTERACTION
From the outside, a religious institution's religious commitments are often taken as somehow fixed in advance: there simply "is" a Catholic or Baptist position on controversial issues,
which can be identified in authoritative statements fiom leaders of the affected religious communities. I t is as if everyone
knew what Georgetown's affiliation with the Society of Jesus
implied for the question of gay rights. In fact, the story is significantly more complicated.
On the most superficial level, one must distinguish between a religion's position and the statements made by religious leaders.33 In congregational churches, statements by
ministers ordinarily do not define the church's position. Even i n
hierarchical churches, statements by authoritative leaders may
not be authoritative as to the government regulation a t issue.
The Pope, for example, has issued statements about homosewality-not all of which have equal authoritative status. Indeed,
the implications of those statements for a Jesuit university's
treatment of student organizations devoted to promoting gay
rights are not self-evident. And, because the Society of Jesus
has a special legal position within the Catholic Church, statements specifically directed at the gay-rights issue by the Cardinal with jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, for example,
may not be authoritative." Accordingly, if "the church's" position can be contested from within the church, and if some within the church find acceding to a particular government regulation either acceptable or affirmatively desirable, it is not evi-

In this analysis, I put to one side the issues that arise when a person
33.
unaffiliated with a church claims that his or her personal religious beliefs impel
some action (or when a person affiliated with a church claims that his or her
personal religious beliefs, which differ from those of church leaders, impel some
action). The Court held it irrelevant, for purposes of the constitutional analysis
required by the Free Exercise Clause, that a person's beliefs were "not compelled
by their religion." Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 US. 829, 834
(1989).
I find it at least moderately interesting that the gay-rights controversy
34.
implicated Georgetown, affiliated with the Society of Jesus, not Catholic University,
a pontifical university with a different legal relation to the Cardinal and the Pope.
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dent to me why those who are not church members ought to be
troubled by the Court's decision in Smith.35
More important, a church will usually not have a welldefined position on a particular government regulation when
the regulation is proposed or goes into effect. Leaders often use
the regulation and the burdens it places on their church to
develop a particularized position. For example, as the litigation
proceeded, Georgetown's leaders began to refine their understanding of what "recognition" might entail, and they developed
proposals for how the University might relate to the gay-rights
group in ways short of formal "recognition." In more general
terms, confrontations between government and religious institutions may force both institutions to think in more sustained
and focused ways about their own commitments. Such deliberations might otherwise not occur were the government to assume that it could not regulate any aspect of the institution's
operations because some people, although not the institution
itself (when the controversy began), believed that regulation
adversely affected the institution's religious commitments.
To state it yet another way, religious commitments are not
predefined and knowable i n the abstract. Rather, they are
produced at least in part by complex negotiations. Some negotiations occur within religious institutions. Often the government
does not occupy the position of "other" to all members of a
religious community. Some church members will agree with the
position asserted by the government, and, acting from within
the church, will argue that a careful consideration of the
church's religious commitments will reveal that the church can
comply with both its faith and the government's demands. To
revert to the "interest group" image of government regulation,
church members are also members of the interest groups that
pressure the government to act.
Sometimes, too, church members are initially so bound up
with what they view as the church's "requirements" that they

35.
The critical observation that someone is "more Catholic than the Pope" captures something of this. Professor Hancock's response on this point suggests his
adoption of a version of the "slippery-slope"argument to which Nagel's comment,
supra text accompanying note 11, is an answer. See Ralph C. Hancock, Monistic
and Dualistic Paths to Radical Secularism: Comments on Tushnet, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 141. It also suggests the fear that someone inside a church might end up as
a qoser" at the conclusion of the church's internal discussions. As I indicate below,
see infia text accompanying note 36, I do not believe that the law on this matter
should be shaped by the view of such people.
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overlook or undervalue the secular policies the government
seeks to promote through its general regulations. A forceful
statement by the government may encourage those believers to
take a more thoughtful approach to the religion's commitments.
In turn, this increased attention to religious commitment, occasioned by the government's regulatory efforts, leads to dialogue
within a religious institution.
The dialogue might result in a position the church had not
taken before, or it might result in the church becoming even
more firmly committed to its prior position, now with a greater
appreciation of the relation between that position and its fundamental faith commitment^.^^ Such dialogue also extends
beyond the boundaries of the church. Church'members are
usually voters, and they can demonstrate politically their discomfort with the government's demands. Even small sects can
mobilize support from other churches by invoking general concerns about freedom of religion. This is borne out by the enactment of statutory exemptions for peyote use by the Native
American Church. In this sense, churches are interest groups
too. And, of course, just as church members may reconsider
what commitment to their faith requires when confronted with
a particular government regulation, government regulators
may reconsider what their secular goals require when confronted with resistance by churches.
These "negotiations" can produce a deeper-or at least a
different-understanding of what the institution's religious
commitments really are, both within and without the institution. I n this sense, the benefits of government efforts to regulate religious institutions include the possibility that such efforts will enhance the institution's religious commitments
through clarification of those commitments. If it had been clear
from the outset that the District of Columbia simply could not
apply its human rights ordinance i n any way to Georgetown,
the occasion for the University's serious and extended inquiry
into the meaning of its religious commitment would have been
deferred or, perhaps, lost entirely.
To all this one might respond that, however beneficial to a
church this sort of interaction and dialogue might be, surely

36.
To the extent that Professor Hancock's response is predicated on his determination that I hold views that I expressly disclaim, here and elsewhere, I cannot
respond to it except by suggesting that readers can consider whether his interpretation of my text is accurate.
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Smith does not promote it. For, under Smith,the government
can take the position that it is bound to prevail no matter how
the church's discussions come out. Why bother, then, to struggle within the church over what its commitments entail? If the
church changes its position, why should anyone treat that
change as "clarifying" its commitments rather than submitting
to the sheer power of the state?
To answer the fmst question, it is helpful to remember the
nonconstitutional protections of religious exercise. State constitutional law, statutory interpretation, executive discretion,
and most important, legislative discretion, all combine to protect religious exercise. Observing a dialogue within the church
concerning some regulation that could be imposed on the
church without violating the Federal Constitution pursuant t o
Smith, legislators, executive officials, and judges might consider alternative ways of accomplishing their goals. For example,
if the discussions within Georgetown demonstrate that the
institution has particular difEculties with formal "recognition"
of a gay-rights group, perhaps the relevant statute could be
interpreted to require the University to provide equal treatment in all respects short of formal recognition. Thus, those
within the church would be foolish to throw up their hands-or
view themselves as facing an onslaught of persecution-when
faced with burdensome regulation, for conducting an internal
discussion to define more precisely the meaning of the church's
commitments might produce benefits to the church, even if that
dialogue results in reiterating the church's opposition to the
proposed regulation.
Answering the second question-why should a change in
position by the church be treated as clarification rather than
submission-requires a more extended discussion. We should
begin by asking who is raising this question. An outsider might
be skeptical about church leaders' claims that they truly do
believe that complying with the government's regulation is
consistent with their "new" understanding of their religious
commitments. But, again, it is not clear t o me why the
outsider's perspective is relevant.
Consider next the possibility that those who Yost" within
the church are raising the question. They believe that their
church's original understanding of its commitments was truer
to their faith and what they view as the faith of their church
than its new one. Why, though, should their vision of the true
faith prevail over what is, at least hypothetically, the vision
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offered by the church's authoritative leaders?
In short, it seems to me that the position the church takes
after conducting its internal dialogue must be received, for
legal and religious purposes, as an authoritative statement of
the church's religious commitments. Moreover, it must be
viewed as authoritative even if it is a dramatic change from an
earlier position and even if the change appears to have been
induced by threats of government oppression. As a thought
experiment, suppose that one hundred years pass, and as historians we then examine the church's position. It is certainly
possible that we will see the new position as unauthentic-a
mere submission to coercive state pressure. Here, the position
Georgetown ended up taking in the gay-rights litigation would
be seen as a failure of nerve and faith. Yet, it seems possible as
well that we will see the old position as unauthentic-resting
on a thoughtless failure to consider the implications of the
church's fundamental commitments and faith when approaching problems that were unforeseen by those who formulated the old position. Pursuant to this alternative view, the
position Georgetown initially took in the gay-rights litigation
would be understood as a thoughtless adherence t o mindless
traditi~n.~'
It seems worth mentioning that churches reconsider the
implications of their commitments in response t o a wide range
of social forces. Churches have rethought their positions on gay
rights in jurisdictions that never tried to apply human rights
ordinances t o them. Women have been ordained in denominations that previously strenuously resisted that change, without
any law being brought to bear, and indeed in the face of express exemptions from civil rights laws. I doubt that anyone
could seriously defend the proposition that these changes are
unauthentic capitulations to social pressure (although, again,
outsiders and "losers" have put forth that proposition; and
again, with hindsight they may indeed be viewed as capitulations).
If we cannot reasonably treat such voluntary changes as
capitulations (without demonstrating disrespect for a church's
own statements about its faith commitments), why can changes
induced by government regulation be viewed in that way?
37.. It should be clear, and if not this note should make it clear, that I take no
position on the authenticity of either Georgetown's pre- or postlitigation interpretation of what its religious commitments require.

'
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While it is analytically possible to distinguish sharply between
changes induced by dialogues responding to noncoercive social
forces and those induced by dialogues responding to the threat
of coercion, only lawyers would consider that distinction important, particularly in a society and culture like the United
States that is generally, though not universally, tolerant with
respect to religious matters. From within a church, the distinction between mere social pressure and state coercion is not
categorical; what matters is which is stronger, and, again, only
lawyers would think that the threat of state coercion is categorically stronger than social pressure.
I n the end, of course, Smith means that a government may
disregard a church's religious commitments and impose burdensome regulations. Even this, however, has some facets
worth examining to determine whether something can be salvaged for religious liberty.
I begin with observations about the uneasiness I feel in
seeing religious institutions seek exemptions from general
regulations. One source of my uneasiness is really no more
than a suspicion or a sense about constitutional interpretation
in the free exercise area-a suspicion that is confirmed by the
Supreme Court's behavior prior to Smith, and by Justice
O'Comor's concurring opinion therein. Stated simply, I believe
that courts interpreting the Constitution to require some exemptions, for some religious institutions, and for some religious
practices, are likely to do so in a troublingly discriminatory
manner. The closer a practice is to the mainstream, the more
likely it is that the courts will find no compelling interest for
the regulation.
The overall effect of such discriminatory extension of religious exercise exemptions creates three levels of free exercise
law. First, legislatures protect truly mainstream religions by
enacting exemptions under the doctrine of permissible accommodation of religion or by avoiding enactments that have a
troublesome impact on mainstream practices. Second, courts
protect religions on the close-in borders of the mainstream.
Third, neither the courts nor the legislature protect exotic religions. In eliminating the possibility of this type of discrimination, Smith eliminates the second tier. This elimination does
not come without cost, but it has some benefits that are too
easily overlooked.
The courts defined the boundary between the second and
third tiers under pre-Smith law. In this regard, Justice
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O'Connor's opinion in Smith is instructive. Justice O'Connor
applied pre-Smith law and found a substantial burden on free
exercise, but concluded that the burden was justified by the
government's compelling interest in promoting a drug-free
society? Surely, were one to predict the outcome under any
test, the religious claimants were bound to lose this case;3g
the only question was how they were going to lose?' PreSmith doctrine enabled Justice O'Connor to present herself as
a person serious about problems of religious intolerance and
concerned about the imposition of unnecessary damage on a
minority religious community. At the same time, pre-Smith law
allowed her to impose the very damage she was ostensibly
concerned about. In other words, p r e s m i t h doctrine is too
comforting to judges who often act similarly to other powerwielders. Accordingly, when its magnitude is honestly measured, eliminating a judicially rationalized discrimination
among religions is a benefit that may well outweigh the cost to
religious liberty occasioned by Smith.
My uneasiness about the discriminatory extension of religious exemptions is paralleled by an uneasiness with Establishment Clause doctrine regarding government use of religious
symbols. As is well known, the Court's Establishment Clause
doctrine gives governments incentives to represent that the
symbols they deploy are not religious, at least not deeply or
seriously religioudl This is particularly true when governments are embroiled in litigation over the symbols they have
employed. To my mind, it seems not wildly idealistic to think
that, on the whole, religions would be better off if the government adhered to a strict separationist position with regard to
religious symbols. At a minimum, such a n approach would

38.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 905-07 (1990) (O'Comor, J., concurring).
39. Imagine the headlines and the editorial comments had the case come out
the other way: "Supreme Court Says Drug Agencies Cannot Fire Drug Users."
40.
I acknowledge that, formally speaking, two Justices who joined Justice
Scalia's opinion for the Court might have said, "If we are required to apply the
'compelling state interest' test, we find ourselves reluctantly compelled to find no
such interest here, and therefore hold for the claimants." For a version of such a
statement by a Justice who joined Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, see Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). I cannot, however,
identify who those Justices might be.
41.
For a comment to this effect, see Kenneth Karst, The First Amendment, the
Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
503, 522-24 (1992).
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enable religious symbols to be truly religious.
PreSmith doctrine also gave judges incentives to minimize
the seriousness of the intrusions on religious liberty that they
routinely authorized. The parallel to the Establishment Clause
argument is that perhaps religions would be better off if decision-makers were forced to face up to the harm they inflicted
on religious liberty. Pre-Smith law encouraged decision-makers
to pass the buck. A legislator or an assistant prosecutor would
say, ;We shouldn't do this because it infringes on religious
liberty." Naturally, given the country's legal culture, someone
would respond by saying something like, "The courts will sort
out the constitutional issue, so we can do what we think is
sound policy." Yet, when the cases were heard in court, the
judges actually applied a weak "compelling state interest" test,
including deference to the legislature. Ultimately, they ended
up saying, 'Well, the legislature thought that it had a good
reason for adopting this regulation despite its impact on religious minorities, and who are we to displace its judgment?"
The result of this process was that no one ever really considered the statute's impact on religious minorities, who were
persecuted without anyone taking responsibility. At least under
Smith, people know whose hands are bloody.
Finally, a third source of my uneasiness is that pre-Smith
law put religious believers in the position of supplicants and
may have confounded two domains of life that ought to be kept
separate.42 One reading of James Madison's Memorial and
~ e m o n s t r a n c eoffers
~ ~ a sectarian justification for this almost
jurisdictional separation. Madison claimed that a person's duty
to God is "precedent both in order and time, and in degree of
obligation, to the claims of civil society," from which he concluded that "in matters of religion, no man's right is abridged
Thus, "[tlhe religion . . . of
by the institution of civil so~iety.'"~
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man."45

42.
I acknowledge that this uneasiness should be presentand, in my case, is
presentin c o ~ e d i o nwith requests for legislative accommodations of religious
exercise. That, in part, accounts for the parenthetical in the title of my first essay
on legislative accommodations, Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988).
RELIGIOUSFREEDOM:A MEMORIALAND REMONSTRANCE
43. JAMESMADISON,
(Lincoln & Edmonds 1819).
44.
Id. at 6.
45.
Id.at5.
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Madison wrote against a background of an established
church. When the government in that environment enacts legislation respecting religion, it claims authority to do so because
of its religious warrant. If those living under such a regime
accede to its claims, they give a human institution authority
equivalent to that of Deity.46 A state with an established
church, to the extent that it claims authority to determine for
its citizens what they ought in conscience do, is idolatrous. As
Madison put it, religious establishments, considered in this
way, "impl[y] . . . that the civil magistrate is a competent judge
of religious truth," which is "an arrogant preten~ion."~"[Nlo
man's right is abridged by the institution of civil society," then,
because no human institution can-when the concepts of authority and Deity are properly understood--displace the authority of Deity.
Two points should be noted about this interpretation of
Madison's thought. First, as Professor McConnell has stated,
the question of free exercise exemptions arises only when "a
law or government practice . . . makes no reference to religion
and has a secular justification unrelated to the suppression of
religion."48 Yet, the secular justifications for these practices
indicate that the government is not claiming religious authority
as their basis.4gTherefore, they are not expressions of the sort
of idolatry to which, on my interpretation, Madison's thought

My thoughts along these lines have been influenced by comments made by
46.
Stanley Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder at a conference on "Religious Freedom:
Exemptions Based on Conscience." The conference was held at the Georgetown
University Law Center on April 3-4, 1989, as part of the University's bicentennial
celebration. I do not suggest, however, that Hauerwas or Yoder would agree with
my conclusions. See John H. Yoder, Response of an Amateur Historian and a Religious Citizen, 7 J.L. & RELIG.415 (1989).
47.
MADISON,
supra note 43, at 8.
McConnell, supra note 20, at 1419.
48.
There remains a problem in situations where the legislature establishes a
49.
religion in the core sense. Would the courts be claiming improper authority, in my
terms, were they to overturn such an establishment? Madison's statement in the
Memorial and Remonstrance that "[rleligion is wholly exempt from [the] cognizance"
of civil society, MADISON,
supra note 43, at 6, suggests his perhaps inadequate answer: that the government lacks both power and authority to enact such an establishment, and that judicial invalidation of an establishment does not thereby set up
the judges as people who can determine the boundaries between the Deity and
civil society. Hamilton restated the argument in the following terms: "For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?" THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) (emphasis added). This articulation is somewhat more adequate when applied to a national government with enumerated powers.
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was directed. Second, and perhaps more important, the preSmith regime instituted a form of idolatry in its acquiescence
to the judiciary as an institution that can authoritatively determine when religious conscience ought, in the worldly domain,
yield to government demand.50 The judiciary may have the
power to determine the boundary between conscience and executive or legislative power, but, on the sectarian interpretation
of Madison's thought, it can never have authority to determine
that boundary. Yet, on this interpretation, the idolatry that
Madison criticized consisted precisely in that very confusion of
power and authority.
In one aspect, Smith almost explicitly offers this justification. Before Smith, government practices imposing burdens on
religious exercise could be justified by some important or compelling secular interest. As courts struggled with this understanding, they came to believe that they had to consider the
place, central or otherwise, that the burdened activity had in a
believer's religious universe; otherwise, they concluded, the
government would be unable t o promote substantial yet
noncompelling interests when they burdened trivial aspects of
religious exercise. Smith argued that such an evaluation of the
centrality of religious belief was essential t o the coherence of
the previous approach, and that judicial evaluation of the centrality of religious beliefs was fundamentally inconsistent with
the premises of the Constitution's religion clauses.51 In other
words, to the extent that a doctrine of free exercise exemptions
requires such evaluations, it places judges in an authoritative
position over religious belief in an idolatrous manner.

IV. CONCLUSION
How should believers respond to governmental assertions
of authority? I have suggested a sectarian position, that they
ought to deny such authority while acknowledging the sheer
power of government t o have its way. That, though, is precisely
the regime that Smith establishes. In this way, Smith might be

Permissible accommodations--that is, those chosen by legislatures as a mat50.
ter of policy-might not raise the question of idolatry, because they might rest, not
on a legislative claim of authority to determine when amscience ought to yield, but
on the legislature's recognition of the social reality that enforcing its prescriptions
in the face of religious conscience would produce more social disharmony than that
produced by allowing an exemption.
51. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U S . 872, 886-87 & n.4 (1990).
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viewed as a sectarian decision that acknowledges the power of
government to act in matters affecting religious conscience but
denies it the authority to do so.
Still, this is a sectarian justification, and the First Amendment need not be interpreted to rely on a particular and contestable view of the relation between religion and the rest of
society's institutions. Therefore, as a matter of constitutional
law, I do not offer this perspective as a defense of Smith.Rather, I offer it as an extraconstitutional view of the decision, a
view that might be offered by an observer of the practice of
constitutional law (as distinct from a practitioner of constitutional law).52
Suppose that Smith does license the possibility of serious
religious persecution. In this venue I need not remind readers
that some religions have been shaped by the experience of
persecution, and indeed, they have made that expe+ence central to their understanding of the relationship between God
and the secular universe. The jurisdictional division I have
sketched ultimately rests on the view-taken
by my religion-that religious believers reside in two territories: that of
the state, in which they are physically located, and that of
God.53(In this way, being somewhat removed from law making is inherent to my understanding of my religious tradition.)
Adherents of religions that have been shaped by the experience
of persecution cannot easily forget that there are two territories, even during the occasional periods of unilateral declarations of truce by the state. They know that their religions are
always at risk.
Others, though, may become too comfortable with the state
in which they happen to reside. People may live too easily with
the illusion that they will not suffer at the hands of others. For
me, therefore, the issue is how to dissipate that illusion. And,
in the end, that is necessarily a strategic judgment. I am not

52.
The distinction between observers and practitioners is, of course, not sharp.
Though I may not make law in the dired sense that a legislator or judge does, or
in the somewhat less dired sense that a litigator does, as a scholar I contribute to
discussions that help shape legal and public understanding of the law. In that
indirect sense, then, I am a practitioner. Yet, it is precisely the fact that I am
somewhat removed from direct law making that allows me to offer my perspective.
53.
I put aside for the present the question of what happens when the Messiah
comes-a point central to controversies between some orthodox Jews and religious
Zionists, and a point that shows quite clearly that the perspective I am exploring
is theological.
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f d y committed to the position that Smith is strategically
justified in this sense; the illusion that the state is not "the
Other" might be dissipated by other doctrines. However, the
possibility that Smith is strategically justified is worth considering. Perhaps religion is special, so that the lesson must be
taught in c o ~ e c t i o nwith religion. Alternatively, perhaps the
tradition of specifically religious tolerance in the United States
has induced greater complacency as to religion than is justified.
Finally, consider the three-tiered structure of pre-Smith
law. Adherents of mainstream religions might not have seen
the government as "the Other" because they benefited directly
from legislative accommodations, and because they could take
satisfaction in judicial protection of "close-in" nonmainstream
religions. The latter religions are "close in" precisely because
adherents of mainstream religions can sympathetically identify
with them without sharing their views. The third tier consists
of exotic religions, which are exotic precisely because adherents
of mainstream religions cannot sympathetically identify with
them. Before Smith, these religions would be persecuted, and
adherents of mainstream religions would not be troubled. By
eliminating the second tier, Smith authorizes the persecution of
religions with which most people can sympathetically identify.
It thereby demonstrates t o all that the state is "the Other."
All things considered, I believe that everyone ought to
appreciate that we are all fundamentally at risk because of our
religious commitments. In teaching that lesson, Smith makes
an important contribution to the cause of religious liberty.

